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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID McMURDIE, WILLIAM WHIT-
TAKER, CAROL WHITTAKER, and 
DENISE WHITTAKER, by her Guardian 
Ad Litem, Willian1 Whittaker, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH JOHN-
SON, H. E. WOOLF, and NORTH 
AMERICAN VAN LINES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
8894 
H. E. WOOLF AND NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This was a suit for personal injuries instituted by the 
present appellants against the respondents and against 
certain additional defendants who were included in the 
suit because one of thein, MrH. Nancy Dillingham Olsen, 
was the driver of the car which crashed into appellants' 
automobile. 
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l\!lr~. Olsen, her husband, and his ernplo:·er, Frontier 
Sales, a corporation, rnade an independent settlernent ·with 
appellants iunnediately prior to trial and thereafter, they 
were disrnissed from the action upon motion of appellants. 
The suit was then tried as against the respondents herein 
and resulted in a jury verdict of no cause of action in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County with Judge Merrill 
C. Faux presiding. 
A motion for new trial 'vas filed, argued and denied. 
This appeal followed. 
These respondents cannot accept appellants' state-
rnent of fact because it is incomplete and is in conflict 
with the fundarnental principle that the Supreme Court 
should be asked to "consider those facts that nwst strong-
ly support the verdict, where there is evidence pointing 
in different directions." ill orley Y. Rodberg, (l~tah 1958) 
323 P. 2d 717. These respondents accordingly will set 
forth a different statement of facts. 
S~rATEl\1EXT OF F ~.\.CT~ 
rrhe accident occurred at about 1 :15 a.rn. December 
15, 1936, on a straight stretch of U.S. Highway -!0 at a 
point about eleven rniles north of Tooele and about one 
rnile west of what is known as Lake Point near the Tooele-
Salt Lake County line. The highwa~· at that point is 
northeast and southwest in direction. For approximately 
two and one-half rniles the road is straight and the acci-
dent happened in the approxirnate center of that length 
\ 
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of straight road, (R. 222) when a pick-up truck, driven by 
Mrs. Olsen, srnashed into the rear of a stopped car occu-
pied by appellants. 
At this point, the road had a total hard surface of 
33 feet of which 30 feet was for travel and l¥2 feet on 
each side was separated from the travel portion by a solid 
yellow guide line. The lanes for opposing traffic were 
designated by an irregular white line down the center 
of the road (Ex. 6-D). There was practically no shoulder 
and the Highway Patrol Officer testified "we would 
consider that as a no-shoulder highway" (R. 227). He 
defined this term to mean that the hard surface was built 
out to the extreme edge of the road and from the hard 
surface the road dropped down into a "burrow pit." 
vVhat shoulders there were, were wet and muddy due to 
a previous rain (R. 227). 
Prior to the accident a large van-type truck going in 
a northeasterly direction toward Salt Lake City experi-
enced difficulty with its lights so that its driver apparent-
ly felt required to pull over to the side of the road in 
order to repair them. This van has been designated 
throughout the case as Unit No.1. It has not otherwise 
been identified and neither its owner nor its driver has 
been narned as a defendant herein. 
Unit No. 2, a tractor-trailer combination owned by 
the defendant Johnson and driven by his employee Under-
wood, was also proceeding toward Salt Lake City. Under-
wood saw the first truck and, realizing that it was in 
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trouble, he pulled to a stop approxin1ately 150 feet ahead 
of the front of Unit No.1 and went back to see if he could 
assist the driver of No. 1. 
Underwood left his lights and clearance lights on 
and walked back to the disabled truck. In a few moments, 
he was able to repair the electrical circuit which caused 
t~1e truck lights to go on. Just before the repairs were 
completed, a third truck, referred to in this case as Unit 
No. 3, owned by North American Van Lines and driven 
by the respondent H. E. Woolf, came upon the scene from 
the west and, seeing that there \Yas some difficulty, \Voolf 
pulled ahead of Truck No. 2 approximately the same dis-
tance as No. 2 had pulled ahead of K o. 1 and got out to 
see if he could be of assistance. By the tin1e he walked 
back to No. 1, its lights were on and all three truck drivers 
then started for their trucks to drive away (R. :291, :29:2). 
Unit No. 1 had been pulled off of the paved portion 
of the road as far as could be driven without tipping the 
truck over and, in fact, l ~nit X o. 1 was described by all 
witnesses as ''tilting" over to the burrow pit side of the 
road. Units No. 2 and No.3 were not parked so they tilted 
hut the~' were over as far as they could safely be driven 
(R. 276). In fact, appellant \Yillirun \Yhittaker, a truck 
driver of sorne twenty years' experience, conceded that 
the two trucks were "stopped in the highway because 
they couldn't get off" ( R. 187. 1~~). 
The investigating trooper of the Utah Highway 
Patrol described the steepness of the area at the edge of 
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the hard surfaee of the road and stated it would be "un-
\rise'' to drive on that area when it is wet (R. 228). 
Appellants had been cmning from California to Salt 
Lake City in a Nash autonwbile owned and driven by 
\Villiam \\'hittaker. vVhen Whittaker was about one-half 
mile away, (R. 172) he saw the lights of the trucks ahead 
including blinker lights and red lights (R. 204). He 
realized there was smne difficulty so he began to slow 
down. 
When he went by the tilted van, Unit No. 1, he had 
reduced his speed to four or five miles an hour. There 
were cars coming from the opposite direction and they 
had also slowed down because of the apparent trouble 
(R. 195). 
Although apparently there was room for Whittaker's 
passenger car to pass Unit No. 2 without crossing the 
center line of the highway (R. 235) he elected to stop 
behind Cnit No. 2 until he had a better opportunity to 
pass. 
While Whittaker was stopped, a man at the scene 
(apparently YV oolf, driver of No. 3) was walking along 
carrying a lighted flare and he suddenly dived under Unit 
Xo. 2 (R. 195, 201). This caused Whittaker to look in his 
rear-view mirror to see what caused the man to dive for 
safety and it was then that Whittaker saw the Olsen pick-
up truck bearing down on hi1n frmn the rear. At this, he 
pressed harder and harder on his brake pedal, which 
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activated his large red stop lights on the rear of his ear. 
He was "trying to do everything" he could to draw the at-
tention of ~Irs. Olsen to hi1n, but without success (R. 180). 
Although the right side of the highway had some 161f2 
feet of hard surface (Ex. 6-D), it was fully occupied by 
Unit No.2 and by the Whittaker car, which was back of 
and to the left of Unit 2. Whittaker described his posi-
tion relative to No. 2 as "right behind his rear duals on 
the left side which would be towards the 1niddle line. I 
was straddling his rear duals" (R. 141). 
Since there was traffic in the opposing lane, and 
the right side was fully occupied by Whittaker and l~nit 
No. 2, Mrs. Olsen had no part of the highway open to her 
(R. 202). Despite the red and white lights and the blinker 
lights on all the trucks, despite the large red lights on 
Whittaker's Nash and his blinking turn signal, :Mr~. 
Olsen never observed or realized the danger until too 
late. Her car left only eight feet of skid marks before 
in1pact (R. 22G). The i1npact propelled the Nash forward 
in to the rear of ll nit X o. :2. The X ash "·as totally de-
nwlished. 
Her only explanation for haYing failed to observe 
the car and truck blocking her lane of travel was that 
before she reached the area, she "just saw a bunch of 
lights frmn further down the road and as I crune closer, 
I thought that unit was nwving ... I thought the unit was 
moving be<·ausP \\"e were on an open highway" (R. 252). 
\ 
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\Vhen t::>he got closer to the truck, she saw it was not 
moving. She then "went out to go around it." She saw 
oncoming traffic so she "tried to go back in" ( R. 254). 
rrhen, for the first time, she saw the Whittaker car. 
8he couldn't remember whether it1:i lights were on. She 
could only say: " ... I just saw it as one big thing" (R. 
:25±). 
Unit No. 3, which was the van driven by respondent 
H. E. \V oolf and owned by North American Van Lines, 
was a considerable distance ahead of No. 2. It was vari-
ously estin1ated as being from 100 to 150 feet from the 
front of No. 2, and since the latter was 49 feet long, it 
is clear No. 3 was far removed from the impact area, 
which was at the rear of No. 2 (R. 234, 159). 
It was claimed by appellants, however, that Woolf 
should have parked off the highway and even farther 
ahead of No. 2 because he should have foreseen that park-
ing where he did 1night constitute a trap (R. 35). 
Woolf and North American Van Lines contended that 
their van was properly parked but that even if it had 
not been, its position in no way contributed to the cause 
of the accident, particularly since no one could reasonably 
have foreseen the intervening acts or omissions of Mrs. 
Olsen (R. 36). 
These issues were framed in the trial court's instruc-
tions to the jury and resulted in a verdict in favor of 
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the~e respondents and against appellants, "no cause of 
action" (R. 113). 
STAr:L,E~lE~T OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE RECORD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE RE·CORD. 
Although appellants have presented five separate 
points in their Statement of Points, they have discussed 
in their Argument alleged errors of the trial court in 
fourteen separate particulars, relating to an equal num-
ber of instructions and, in addition, have urged that the 
respondents were guilty of a violation of regulations 
of the Interstate Comn1erce Conunission, ·which allega-
tion wa~ never Inade until after the case had been pre-
tried, tried to a jury and an adverse verdict received. 
In view of this ''shotgun'' attack upon the trial court's 
rulings, \\·e find it difficult to narrow and define appel-
lants' contentions. Th(>refore, these respondents will 
attempt to demonstrate that the trial court ruled correctly 
on appellanb' reque~ted instrurtions and correctly in-
structed the ,jur~· concerning the principles of law appli-
<'ctble to this ease. 
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\Ve will devote no tin1e to the argu1nent set forth 
under appellants' point 2 "Which is to the effect that the 
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury "on foresee-
abilit~· of parking as constituting a trap or danger." 
This clai1n will not be discussed further for the 
reason that the trial court, by its instruction No. 16, 
squarely subrnitted that issue to the jury and, under 
familiar doctrine, appellants cannot complain merely 
because the language of their requested instruction dif-
fered from that actually used by the court. 
Appellants' contention that the case is governed or 
controlled by regulations of the Interstate Commerce 
{jomn1ission need not be considered in this Court, for it 
was never injected into the trial in the court below. The 
purported regulations were never offered in evidence, no 
requests were made to instruct the jury about them, and 
the trial proceeded solely upon the issues as set forth 
at pre-trial. 
The first 1nention of I.C.C. regulations occurred upon 
the argument on appellants' motion for new trial. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates 
a "new trial ... on all or part of the issues ... " (italics 
ours). This seems clearly to mean that there can be a 
revie\\. only of issues which were actually tried by the 
jury. No reason was offered to the trial court, and none 
is mentioned here, why settled procedure should be dis-
regarded or why appellants should be pennitted to rely 
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upon clailns against which respondents had no opportun-
ity to defend. 
Appellants first coinplain that the court erred in its 
instruction 27 because, it is said, the instruction took from 
the jury "any question of concurrent contributing negli-
gence ... and whether defendants' negligence was a con-
tributing proximate cause." (Brief, page ±.) 
~rhe instruction under attack reads: 
"You are instructed that the driver of the 
pickup truck was negligent as a matter of law, 
and if you find that she observed the hazards, if 
any, of the stopped vehicles upon the highway 
or under the circun1stances should have observed 
said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed 
to do so in ti1ne to avoid said accident, then you 
are instructed that the negligence on her part was 
the sole proxi1nate cause of the collision, and your 
verdict n1ust be in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action." 
This instruction h)· the court is a correct statement 
of Utah law as expressed by the Supre1ne Court in deci-
siom~ over a period of 1nore than thirty years. 
For example, in llaar~trich Y. Oregon Short Line 
Com1mny (1927) 70 Utah 552 262 P. 100, a train of cars 
was being backed aero~~ Beck Street in Salt Lake City 
and it was daiuted that the railroad did not light the ear~ 
and was otherwi~P nPgligent hPeanse it failed to give a 
\\'arning of the presenc<.' of tlw train. The evidence dis-
dosed ph~·sical facts revealing that the driver of an on-
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eoming car had ample time for observation of the train. 
lt was held that there 'vas no issue for the jury on causa-
tion because the proxi1nate cause of the accident was 
the conduct of the automobile driver and any failure of 
the railroad to cmnply with the law "had nothing what-
ever to do with the accident and was in no sense the 
proxlinate cause of plaintiff's injury." 
Jlore recent cases have held to the same view. In 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Company (Utah 1953) 263 
P.:2d 2~7, a truck was parked on 27th South Street in 
Salt Lake City. The rear end of the truck extended five 
feet into the paved portion of a twelve foot lane of travel. 
The car in which the deceased was riding struck the rear 
of the truck. The driver of the truck was found negli-
gent and his negligence was found to have joined with the 
conduct of the car driver in causing the accident. 
However, the court drew attention to what it called 
"a clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases." 
The first is, "where one has negligently created a danger-
ous condition (such· as parking the truck) and a later 
actor observed, or circurnstances are such that he could 
not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it." 
In such a situation the Court said that it is "held as a 
matter of law that the later intervening act does inter-
rupt the natural se<1uence of events and cut off the legal 
effect of the negligence" of the person who parked the 
truck. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
The Court went on to say that in the second class of 
case~, a jury question exists, " ... on the rationale that 
it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances may 
arise wherein others Inay not observe the dangerous 
condition until too late to escape it." 
The opinion in the Hillyard cases further observes 
that if the evidence was such as to make mandatory a 
finding that the car driver must have seen the truck as he 
approached, "but nevertheless ran into it, that \\Tould have 
been something so unusual and extraordinary as not to be 
reasonably foreseeable. In such instance, his negligence 
would have been an independent intervening cause, in-
sulating defendant's negligence as a proximate cause ... " 
In the present case, there was no claiin that :Mrs. 
Olsen's view was obstructed or that something prevented 
her frmn seeing the danger earlier. \Vhittaker had slowed 
because of all of the lighted trucks and he can1e to a stop 
in the driving lane with all of his lights ablaze. He could 
give no reason vvhy .Jirs. Olsen failed to see the situation, 
and he conceded he "could have" said at the scene that the 
accident "was caused b~~ the blankety-blank fool in the 
pickup" ( 1\. 194). and he justified this state1nent by say-
ing, "\Yell, I seen the lights and I pulled up and stopped .. , 
After reviewing Instruction K o. :27 in the light of the 
record, it is difficult to ~ee how the trial court in this 
case could havP better infonned the jury of the law con-
cerning this ea~w. A careful examination of the testin1ony 
of l\lrs. 01::-;pn reveals no indication of any other kind of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
negligen<~e \Vhich could have had an effect upon this case. 
Her only explanation for her failure to see the highway 
in front of her and that it was blocked was to the effect 
that she had thought that the trucks were rnoving because 
··we were on an open highway." 
rrhis can be no answer to a claim of negligence. The 
~upreme Court of Utah has rejected such a contention 
in a case less than a year old. In Hirschbach v. Dubuque 
Packing Company (Utah 1957) 316 P. 2d 319, the court 
said: 
"The duty and opportunity of a driver of a 
vehicle on the highway is usually fully as great 
to avoid running into a vehicle which is moving 
in the sarne direction as it is where such second 
vehicle is parked on the highway. The fact that 
the taillights were burning would clearly increase 
the opportunity of the driver of the oncoming 
vehicle to discover, evaluate the situation and 
avoid running into a vehicle which was parked on 
the highway in front of him." 
Since Mrs. Olsen's explanation of the accident fails 
to reveal that she was confronted with an emergency, 
and since the evidence is conclusive that she could and 
should have seen the vehicles on the road ahead of her, 
we submit that this case is governed by the principles of 
the first class of cases discussed in the Hillyard case 
and Mrs. Olsen'~ conduct was a "later intervening act'' 
which interrupted the "natural sequence of events and 
cut off the legal effect" of the conduct of those who 
parked the trucks. 
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Instruction No. 27 states this principle accurately and 
completely. It simply told the jury that if Mrs. Olsen 
failed to see the vehicles because of her negligence, then 
her failure was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
This is but another ·way of stating the doctrine set forth 
in the Hillyard case. 
Therefore, these respondents assert that even tf i1 
cou~d have been found that 1Ir. \Yoolf parked his truck 
on the highway in a negligeni manner, it was the latei 
ac~ ~f M:r;:. OlsE·n who ("ne~di~·Pntly failed to avoid .. thf 
trucks upon the highway which "cut off the legal effect" 
of any negligence on the part of ~Ir. \Yoolf. 
In a case decided early this year the Supreme Court 
of Utah again affirmed the doctrine which is contained 
within the court's instructions in the present case. In 
Lewis v. Savage (February 1958) 322 P.2d 152, a truck 
was parked on a four lane highway and for purposes 
of its opinion the court assu1ned, \\ithout deciding the 
question, that the truck was unla\vfully parked. The court 
held: 
'' \Vhere, as in this case. the parking of the 
truck created no danger or hazard to others using 
the highway who used any ordinary caution to see 
and avoid collis,ivus u·itllz substantial objects plain-
ly visible on the higlzwa.tl in front of them, the 
court's finding that the negligenee of such other 
driver was the sole proxilnate cause of the acci-
dent wa~ reasonable and an1pl~· supported by the 
evidence." (En1phasis supplied.) 
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Appellant~' final argu1nents see1n to attack the trial 
court's interpretation of Utah statutes governing park-
ing of motor vehicles on the highway and the placement 
of flares around disabled vehicles. 
~edion 41-6-153, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states, 
in substance, that the driver of a disabled vehicle must 
place flares or other warning devices on the highway in 
the night hours. Section 41-6-101 prohibits parking on the 
paved portion of a highway when it is practical to park 
off that part of the highway. 
Ignoring the plain legislative intent of these sections, 
and overlooking the principle that legislative language 
should be interpreted to give effect to the plain meaning 
of the words, appellants say: "The mere fact that the 
defendant (sic) were not disabled does not relieve them'' 
from the responsibility to put out flares. 
The obvious answer is that if the legislature had in-
tended to require all trucks stopping on the highway to 
put out flare~, whether disabled or not, it would have 
said so, particularly since the statutes are specific and 
detailed concerning truck specifications, equipment and 
operation. 
Even if it were pennissible for this Court to legislate 
as appellants ask it to do, we submit that it would be 
highly unreasonable to require a driver in the position of 
respondent Woolf to put out flares before he could walk 
back down the road to inquire about the trouble with the 
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tilted truck. It is cornmon knowledge that trucks must 
stop repeatedly to check tires and other equipment and 
if flares are to be placed at each stop, they would soon 
be viewed as commonplace, rather than as the warnings 
which our present law contemplates. 
Appellants further contend, however, that a duty to 
place flares exist::; independent of statute and it is said 
the trial court erred in failing to recognize that the re-
spondents had such a duty-a "common law duty to 
warn." 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, appel-
lants' requested instructions on the subject of flares (R. 
37, 7:), 74) ·were all couched in statutory language, with 
statutory citations, and the present argument, therefor~ 
earns the dubious distinction of an afterthought. 
Second, the trial court granted appellants' request 
No. 11, which is the only request even renwtely corres-
ponding to their present argun1ent, and subn1itted it to 
the jun· exaetl~· as requested. Thi~ was Instruction X o. 
16, which was not linrited to flares, but allowed the jury 
to detennine whether parking trucks "in a series without 
giving some warning'' ,,·as negligence. This is a proper 
statmnent of the issue, particularly since nothing further 
was asked of the trial court by counsel. 
Another l'ador n1ust not be overlooked in connuent-
ing upon the question of flare~. \Yillimu \Yhittaker, the 
prineipal ,,·itnP~s on his own behalf and on behalf of the 
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other appellants, admitted on cross-examination that he 
had said upon his deposition that one of the men at the 
scene had been carrying a lighted flare or fusee just a 
moment before irnpact. This testimony had been given 
in October, 1957, before the present respondents were 
brought into the case by the amended complaint. At 
trial, he said there were no lighted flares at the scene of 
the accident, but his admission on deposition, which was 
not explained away, created a factual conflict for the jury 
to determine. 
The jury could well have determined, from this evi-
dence, that the respondent H. E. Woolf parked his truck 
and walked back with a lighted flare or fusee in his hand 
and, if this were found to be so, certainly this would have 
served as an adequate warning to all oncoming traffic. 
It is, therefore, difficult to see how appellants were 
prejudiced, as to their claim against the respondents 
\Voolf and North A1nerican Van Lines, by the alleged 
errors of the trial court relating to flares. 
The ren1aining contentions in appellants' brief cen-
ter around the question of whether these respondents 
parked on the highway when it was "practical" to have 
parked elsewhere. The jury found they did not and an ex-
amination of the record convinces us that a contrary find-
ing would not have been supported by the evidence. 
The Highway Patrolman, truck driver Underwood 
and appellant \Villiam Whittaker all testified to the 
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smne effect - that there was practically no shoulder, 
that the trucks could not safely be driven on the steep, 
rnuddy slope leading to the burrow pit and, in the words 
of Whittaker, the trucks were "stopped in the highway 
because they couldn't get off" (R. 187, 188). 
The trial court asked the jury to determine this issue. 
It did so. Its determination is substantially supported 
by the evidence. X o reason has been offered here to 
justify a rejection of that deterrnination. 
CONCLU~IOX 
Throughout this brief, respondents H. E. \Y oolf and 
North Arnerican Van Lines have discussed the legal 
principles involved in a case of this kind, even though 
they remain strongly of the opinion that no facts were 
proved, and none exist, which justify institution of suit 
against them. 
It has never been shown how \Yoolf. who parked 
nwre than half a football field fr01n the point of impact, 
could reasonabJ~~ have anticipated that a car, such as 
\Vhittaker"s, would stop in the lane of travel, only to be 
srnashed fron1 the rear b~~ an oncorning vehicle, when all 
vehicles at the scene were fun~~ and plain]y visible for 
rnore than a mile in either direction. 
Even if \Voolf should have anticipated this chain of 
events, it rmnains c01npletely unclear why he should have 
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fore·wPn that his truck parked as it was, should have been 
the ('oncern of the principal participants in this accident.. 
~iotorists are to be judged upon the standard of 
reasonable foreseeability, in the light of the circum-
stances existing at the time of the event. Using this stand-
ard, a jur)· unanimously exonerated these respondents. 
Even b~· the use of the all-encompassing gaze of hindsight, 
appellants have failed to show that a different result 
should have been reached. 
The judgrnent is correct and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
and JOHN H. SNOW 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
AttoTneys joT Defendants and Respondents 
H. E. W·oolf and NoTth AmeTican Van Lines 
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